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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between government revenue and spending in 
Thailand using both linear and nonlinear cointegration techniques. A residual-based 
cointegration test with an unknown structural break is used to detect the linear long-
run relationship between government revenue and spending. For nonlinear 
cointegration tests, both TAR and MTAR models are estimated. The empirical results 
from the estimate of the redidual-based test for cointegration suggest that there is the 
positive long-run relationship between government revenue and spending when 
revenue is dependent variable. However, the results from the estimates of the TAR and 
MTAR models show the absence of asymmetric adjustments towards the long-run 
equilibrium. Based upon the results of linear cointegration test, short-run dynamics 
indicate that any deviation from budgetary disequilibrium will be corrected. In causality 
sense, there is a short-run unidirectional causality running from government spending 
to revenue. The evidence appears to support the fiscal spend-and-tax hypothesis. This 
finding implies that policymakers should be careful in exercising expansionary fiscal 
policy measures because fiscal deficits will occur when revenue falls short of spending.  
Keywords: Government revenue and expenditures, cointegration, causality 
JEL Classification: C32, E62 
 
1. Introduction 
It is well-recognized in the literature that budget deficits can be sustainable in the long-
run for some countries, especially the US.  Even though budget deficits can be 
expansionary, they are related to political support by the public. According to Ghate and 
Zak (2002), politicians choose government spending to maximize support by their 
constituents. When government spending is large enough, the policies chosen by 
politicians are Pareto suboptimal and cause endogenous cycles in output. Most previous 
empirical studies focusing on the relationship between revenue and spending intend to 
test three main hypotheses: tax-and-spend, spend-and-tax or fiscal synchronization. The 
tax-and-spend hypothesis proposed by Friedman (1978) posits that tax revenue causes 
government spending, i. e., an increase in tax revenue leads to higher spending by the 
government and vice versa. The spend-and-tax hypothesis of Peacock and Wiseman 
(1979) and Roberts (1978) states that government spending causes tax revenue. 
Decisions on government spending are made prior to tax collection. The spend-and-tax 
hypothesis is opposite to the tax-and-spend hypothesis. In Granger causality sense, 
there exists unidirectional causality between the two variables. The fiscal 
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synchronization hypothesis proposed by Musgrave (1966) and Meltzer and Richard 
(1981) posits that spending and revenue are interdependent. Therefore, there should 
be bidirectional causality between the two variables. Koren and Stiassny (1998) 
investigate the relationship between government spending and taxation decisions in 
nine industrialized countries. They find that the spend-and-tax hypothesis is supported 
in Italy, Austria and France while the tax-and-spend hypothesis is supported in the UK, 
Netherlands, Germany and the US. Neither hypothesis is supported in Switzerland and 
Sweden. Chang et al. (2002) use annual data during 1951 and 1996 to examine the 
relationship between government revenue and spending in 10 countries. They find 
evidence from only two countries (New Zealand and Thailand) that does not support 
tax-and-spend, spend-and-tax or fiscal synchronization hypothesis. Many previous 
studies employ linear cointegration and causality tests to investigate the relationship 
between government revenue and expenditures (e.g. Hakkio and Rush, 1991, and 
Quintos, 1995). Afonso and Rault (2009) employ bootstrap panel analysis that allows 
for cross-country correlation to examine the causal relationship between government 
spending and revenue for the EU in the period 1960P-2006. They find evidence 
supporting both tax-and-spend and spend-and-tax hypothesis.  
However, the government budget deficit can be sustainable in the long run and 
policymakers will try to reduce the deficit when it reaches a certain threshold level 
(Arestis et al. 2004: Cipolini et al. 2009, among others). Payne and Saunoris (2010) 
estimate an asymmetric error correction model for the UK and find asymmetric 
adjustment toward long-run equilibrium. Their finding lends support for the spend-and-
tax hypothesis. Paleologou (2013) examines the revenue-expenditure nexus in Sweden, 
Germany and Greece and finds that asymmetric adjustment towards the long-run 
equilibrium is found for Greece only. Athanesenas et al. (2014) re-examines the 
revenue-expenditure relationship for Greece. They find evidence of asymmetric 
interactions between the two variables in both the long- and short-run time horizon. 
Their evidence supports the synchronization hypothesis while the evidence found by 
Paleologou (2013) supports the spend-and-tax hypothesis for Greece. Tiwari and 
Mutascu (2016) examine the relationship between government revenue and spending 
in Romania using threshold regression. They find the existence of nonlinear and 
asymmetric adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium. Their results also support the 
spend-and-tax hypothesis. Saunoris (2015) examines the dynamics of the intertemporal 
budget constraint in the US states. The overall results lend support to the tax-and-spend 
hypothesis even though the dynamics differ in some states. 
Thailand has been confronted with larger sizes of budgetary disequilibria as a result of 
the global financial crisis beginning in 2008. Figure 1 shows fluctuations in the Thai 
government budgets measured by surpluses and deficits as percentage of GDP. 
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                              Figure 1. Budgetary Disequilibrium in Thailand, 1993-2016. 
 
The smoother period of fluctuations in the government budgets seems to be few years 
after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 until the last quarter of 2005. However, this 
period seems to contain mostly budget deficits. For the whole sample, the mean of the 
government budget is the deficit of 0.24% of GDP. The largest budget deficit is 9.37% of 
GDP in the first quarter of 2012 while the largest budget surplus is 8.91% in the second 
quarter of GDP. 
 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between government 
revenue and spending by employing nonlinear cointegration tests using quarterly data 
during 1993 and 2016. Two types of cointegration tests are used. Johansen’s 
cointegration test is used to determine whether the long-run relationship between 
government revenue and spending is linear. For nonlinear cointegration and 
asymmetric adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium, the threshold autoregressive 
(TAR) and momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) models are used. The paper 
contributes to the literature by focusing on an emerging market economy that 
experiences more frequent budget deficits than budget surpluses. The results show that 
both TAR and MTAR models do not capture the nonlinear relationship and threshold 
adjustments as documented by some recent studies. However, the results from Gregory 
and Hansen’s (1996) cointegration test capture the linear relationship and symmetric 
adjustments towards long-run equilibrium. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the data and estimation techniques used in the analysis. Section 3 presents 
empirical results and the last section concludes. 
 
2. Data and Estimation Techniques 
2.1 Data 
Quarterly data on general government revenue (Rt), and spending (Gt) are retrieved 
from the website of the Bank of Thailand. Nominal GDP are obtained from the Office of 
National Economic and Social Development Board. All series are measured in millions of 
baht (Thai currency). The government budget as a percentage of GDP is computed as 
the difference between revenue and spending divided by GDP. The time series data 
cover the period from 1993 to 2016. The revenue and expenditure series are seasonally 
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adjusted and transformed to the logarithmic series. The time series property is obtained 
by performing unit root tests. 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests with optimal lag length determined by Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) are performed to determine the property of time series data 
used in the analysis. The results of unit root tests are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Results of Unit Root Tests. 
Variable ADF Statistic (constant) ADF statistic 
(constant+trend) 
R -0.617 -3.115 
ΔR -9.528*** -9.477*** 
G -1.046 -2.810 
ΔG -3.536*** -3.637** 
Note: ***and ** indicate significance at the 1%  and 5% level, respectively. 
 
The results in Table 1 indicate that the revenue and expenditure series are non-
stationary in level, but they are stationary in first differences. Therefore, both series are 
integrated of order one, i.e., they are I(1) series. This time series property is suitable for 
testing cointegration between revenue and expenditures in both linear and non-linear 
cointegration frameworks. 
2.2 Estimation Techniques 
The starting point on the adjustment of revenue and spending toward the long-run 
equilibrium can be drawn from the studies by Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Cunado et 
al. (2004). Testing for cointegration between government and expenditure time series 
can reveal evidence that support the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government. An empirical model for a long-run relationship between government 
revenue and spending using the power functional form is expressed as:  
 
                                                    ttt AGSGR ε
β=                                                            (1) 
 
where GRt denotes government revenue, GSt denotes government spending, εt is the 
error term, A is a constant, and β is the coefficient. By using log transformation of Eq. 
(1), the linear equation can be expressed as: 
 
                                                 ttt eGR ++= βα                                                           (2) 
 
where Rt is the log of government revenue, Gt is the log of government spending, α is the 
log of A, and et is the log of εt. By allowing for a shift in the intercept, the long-run 
equation can be rewritten as: 
 
                                              tttt eGDR +++= βδα                                                    (3) 
 
where Dt is the dummy variable that captures the impact of an unknown structural 
break. In this respect, it can be claimed that the break will affect the decision of fiscal 
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policymakers. This dummy variable takes the value of 1 at the time the break point 
occurred and and 0 otherwise. In the same token, if government revenue determines 
government spending, the equation can be expressed as: 
 
                                              tttt eRDG +++= βδα                                                 (4) 
 
Since the long-run relationship between government revenue and spending can be 
either linear, nonlinear or both, two types of tests for cointegration used are: (1) 
Gregory-Hansen cointegration test proposed by Gregory and Hansen (1996), and (2) 
threshold cointegration tests, both TAR and MTAR models, proposed by Enders and 
Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001).  
The first step of Gregory-Hansen cointegration test is to estimate Eq. (2). The second 
step is the test for unit root in the estimated residual (et) by the following equation: 
                                                tit
k
i
itt ueee +∆+=∆ −
=
− ∑
1
1 βρ                                         (5) 
where k is the optimal lag order. Eq. (4) is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. By taking 
into account the level shift as specified in Eq. (3), the t-statistic of the coefficient the 
lagged residual term is compared with the critical value provided by Gregory and 
Hansen (1996).1 If the t-statistic is larger than the critical value statistic, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. On the contrary of the t-statistic is smaller 
than the critical value statistic, the null hypothesis is accepted. It should be noted that 
this residual-based test for cointegration takes into account possible an unknown 
breakpoint. The Gregory-Hansen cointegration test implicitly assumes a linear 
adjustment mechanism. However, this test is misspecified when the adjustment is 
asymmetric. The Gregory-Hansen cointegration test is also applied to Eq. (4). 
The symmetric adjustment under short-run dynamics using an error correction 
mechanism (ECM) for Eq. (3) is expressed as: 
                          ttit
p
i
jit
p
i
itt eGRDcR 111
1
1
1
111 ˆ ϖλβαδ ++∆+∆++=∆ −−
=
−
=
∑∑                   (6) 
and the ECM for Eq. (4) is expressed as:              
                        ttit
p
i
iit
p
i
itt eGRDcG 212
1
2
1
222 ˆ ϖλβαδ ++∆+∆++=∆ −−
=
−
=
∑∑                   (7) 
Where p is the optimal lag that can be determined by AIC and λi is the speed of 
adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. The error correction term (ECT) is the lagged 
residual series ( 1ˆ −te ). If the coefficient of the ECT is significantly negative and has the 
                                                           
1
 The t-statistic is the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF*)  statistic, which is different from the ADF 
statistic of Engle and Granger (1987). In addition, Phillips’ (1987) procedure is also calculated 
as the Z*t statistic. 
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absolute value of less than one, any deviation from the long-run equilibrium will be 
corrected. 
 
In case of the absence of linear cointegration between revenue and spending, it is 
possible that the long-run relationship is nonlinear and asymmetric. Therefore, the 
threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) 
models are utilized. The two models are residual-based tests developed by Enders and 
Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001). The residuals from the estimates of Eqs. 
(3) and (4) are decomposed, and the test equation is expressed as: 
 
                                     tit
k
i ittttt
veeIeIe +∆+−+=∆ −=−− ∑ ˆˆ)1(ˆˆ 11211 βρρ                     (8) 
where vt ~ iid.(0,σ2) and the lagged augmented term (Δêt-i) can be added to yield 
uncorrelated residuals of the estimates of Eq. (8). The Heaviside indicator function for 
TAR is specified in Eq. (9) while this function for MTAR is specified in equation (10), 
which are: 
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and                                         


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1
ˆ0
ˆ1
t
t
t
eif
eif
I                                                      (10) 
where the threshold value τ can be endogenously determined by the data. If the 
evidence indicates the existence of linear cointegration between revenue and spending, 
the time series dynamics of the relationship between the two variables can be explored 
by a bivariate vector error correction mechanism (VECM). The bivariate VECM can be 
expressed as: 
                                    ttt
k
i
iit
k
i
it veGRR 111
11
0 ˆ ++∆+∆+=∆ −
=
−
=
∑∑ λβαα                       (11) 
and                              ttt
k
i
iit
k
i
it veGRG 212
11
0 ˆ
~
~~ ++∆+∆+=∆ −
=
−
=
∑∑ λβαα                     (12)       
where k is the lag order, λ1 and λ2 are the coefficients showing the speeds of 
adjustment.2 The short-run dynamics allow for testing the alternative hypotheses 
pertaining to the revenue-spending nexus. The coefficients of the lagged differences for 
government revenue and spending show the short-run dynamics while the coefficients 
of the asymmetric errors correction terms are the speeds of adjustment toward the 
long-run equilibrium. Eqs. (11) and (12) can also be used to test for short-run causality 
between revenue and spending. 
 
                                                           
2 The speed of adjustment is 11 ρˆλ tI=  in the first regime and 22 ˆ)1( ρλ tI−=  in the second 
regime while It is expressed in equation (8) for the TAR model and in equation (9) for the MTAR 
model. 
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3. Empirical Results 
Since the revenue and expenditure series are integrated of order one, the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method is estimated without taking into account of structural breaks. The 
Quandt (1960) and Andrews (1993) unknown breakpoint tests and Bai and Perron 
(1998) sequentially determined multiple breakpoint tests are used to determine the 
breakpoints in the estimated equation. The results are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Tests for Structural Breaks.  
Dependent Variable is R 
Testing Method Suggested Breaks Dummy Type Test Statistic 
Quandt and 
Andrews Test 
1998Q2 Shift 44.480*** 
Bai and Perron Test (1) 1998Q2 Shift 44.480** 
 (2) 2002Q4 Shift 25.364** 
Note: *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. In Quandt and 
Andrews tests, the p-values are calculated by Hansen (1997) method. For Bai and Perron tests, 
the 5% critical value is provided by Bai and Perron (2003).  
 
The result from the Quandt and Andrews test indicates the presence of one break point 
in the second quarter of 1998 for the estimated revenue equation. However, the Bai and 
Perron test indicates two break points: 1998Q2 and 2002Q4 for revenue equation. 
However, the most significant break point at the second quarter of 1998 shows that the 
impact of a structural break occurred around the 1997 Asian financial crisis should 
affect the government discipline and transparency in fiscal policy management.  
The results of Gregory and Hansen cointegration test for Eq. (3) are reported in Table 3. 
This cointegration test comprises two procedures: ADF procedure and Phillips 
procedure. 
 
Table 3 
Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test. 
Model 2: Level Shift 
ADF Procedure: 
ADF* Statistic = -5.259 
Lag = 0 
Break Date = 1997Q2 
Phillips’ (1987) Procedure: 
Z*t Statistic = -5.538 
Break Date = 1997Q4 
Note: The 1% critical value provided by Gregory and Hansen (1996) is -5.13. 
 
The results in Table 3 show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 
1% level of significance because both ADF* and Z*t are larger than the critical value.  
The long-run relationship between government revenue and spending is shown in 
Table 4. 
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Table 4  
Long-run Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Rt 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic p-value 
Gt 0.724*** 0.024 30.597 0.000 
Dt 0.035 0.038 0.917 0.362 
Intercept 3..538*** 0.291 12.304 0.000 
Adj. R2 = 0.942, F = 769.643 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
The results in Table 4 show that the possible long-run relationship between 
government revenue and spending is significantly positive. A 1% increase in 
government spending causes revenue to increase by 0.72%. Furthermore, the impact of 
a structural break around the 1997 financial crisis seems to strengthen this long-run 
relationship, but this impact is not significant. The results of linear cointegration test for 
Eq. (4) are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test. 
Model 2: Level Shift 
ADF Procedure: 
ADF* Statistic = -5.260 
Lag = 0 
Break Date = 1997Q2 
Phillips’ (1987) Procedure: 
Z*t Statistic = -5.566 
Break Date = 1997Q3 
Note: The 1% critical value provided by Gregory and Hansen (1996) is -5.13. 
 
The results in Table 5 show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 
1% level of significance because both ADF* and Z*t are larger than the critical value. 
Therefore, government spending and revenue are cointegrated. 
The long-run relationship between government spending and revenue is shown in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6  
Long-run Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Gt 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic p-value 
Rt 1.265*** 0.041 30.597 0.000 
Dt 0.045 0.050 0.886 0.362 
Intercept -3..930*** 0.513 -6.613 0.000 
Adj. R2 = 0.942, F = 769.643 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
The results in Table 6 show that the possible long-run relationship between 
government spending and revenue is significantly positive. A 1% increase in 
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government revenue causes spending to increase by 1.27%. Furthermore, the impact of 
a structural break around the 1997 financial crisis seems to strengthen this long-run 
relationship, but this impact is not significant.  
 
The results of short-run dynamics are reported in Table 7. Table 7 shows the estimated 
ECMs for Eqs. (3) and (4). 
Table 7 
Short-Run Dynamics with Bivariate ECMs 
Panel A: Dependent Vaiable is ΔRt 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
1ˆ −te  -0.156** 0.070 -2.226 0.029 
ΔRt-1 -0.261** 0.110 -2.365 0.020 
ΔRt-2 -0.151 0.106 -1.421 0.157 
ΔGt-1 0.087 0.182 1.576 0.119 
ΔGt-2 0.137 0.182 0.753 0.453 
Dt -0.039* 0.020 -1.942 0.055 
Intercept 0.045** 0.021 2.184 0.032 
Adj. R2 = 0.176, F = 4.273 
Diagnostics 
Serial Correlation: χ2(2) = 3.711 (0.210) 
Heteroskedasticity: χ2(1) = 0.297 (0.894) 
Normality: JB = 134.27 (0.000) 
Functional Form: F = 0.061 (0.805) 
Panel B: Dependent Vaiable is ΔGt 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
1ˆ −te  -0.033 0.036 -0.916 0.306 
ΔRt-1 -0.102 0.065 -1.562 0.122 
ΔRt-2 0.008 0.062 0.135 0.893 
ΔGt-1 -0.525*** 0.109 -4.820 0.000 
ΔGt-2 -0.192* 0.108 -1.783 0.078 
Dt -0.017 0.012 -1.422 0.159 
Intercept 0.049*** 0.137 3.623 0.000 
Adj. R2 = 0.234, F = 5.693  
Diagnostics 
Serial Correlation: χ2(2) = 4.658 (0.097) 
Heteroskedasticity: χ2(1) = 2.264 (0.104) 
Normality: JB = 0.770 (0.641) 
Functional Form: F = 3.225 (0.075) 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, the number 
in parenthesis is p-value. 
 
The results in Table 7 reveal that the ECMs for both long-run equations pass all 
important diagnostic tests, except for the results in Panel A that exhibit non-normal 
distribution of the residuals. However, non-normality is not as serious as the other 
three diagnostic tests. 
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Panel A of Table 7 reports the short-run dynamics when government revenue is 
assumed to be dependent on government spending. The coefficient of the error 
correction term is -0.156 and significant at the 5% level. This coefficient has a correct 
sign with the absolute value of less than one, which indicates that any deviation from 
the long-run equilibrium relationship will be corrected. Even though the 1997 financial 
crisis dummy does not affect the long-run relationship, this dummy negatively affect the 
short-run relationship at the 10% level of significance. However, lagged changes in 
spending do not affect a change in revenue. The short-run dynamics for Eq. (4) are 
shown in Panel B of Table 6. The estimated coefficient of the error correction term has a 
correct sign with the absolute value of less than one. However, this coefficient is not 
statistically significant, which indicates that any deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium will not be corrected. In other words, the long-run relationship is not stable 
when government spending is dependent variable. Similarly, lagged changes in revenue 
do not affect a change in spending. Therefore, it can be conclude that the estimated Eq. 
(3) is more reliable than the estimated Eq. (4). 
The residual-based tests of cointegration between the two series assume that the 
cointegrating equation is time invariant. However, the long-run relationship can be 
nonlinear with asymmetric adjustments toward long-run equilibrium as documented by 
the recent literature. To test for asymmetric adjustment, the TAR and MTAR models for 
Eq. (3) are estimated. The results are shown in Table 8.  
Table 8 
Estimates of the Budgetary Disequilibrium: TAR and MTAR Models. 
Parameters Models 
 TAR MTAR 
ρ1 -0.415 -0.331 
ρ2 -0.299 -0.548 
Threshold Value -0.063 -0.049 
Ф 5.846 [7.464] 6.195 [8.450] 
t-Max -2.083 [-1.962] -2.630 [-1.880] 
F-equal 0.456 [6.881] 1.073 [8.531] 
κ 3 3 
Note: The number in bracket is the simulated 5% critical value by 1,000 numbers of 
simulations, and κ is the number of lag determined by AIC. 
 
The lag of augmented term is 3 (κ =3) for the estimated TAR and MTAR models. The 
threshold values are determined by the data. The threshold value for the TAR model is -
-0.063 while the threshold value for the MTAR model is -0.049. These threshold values 
are used to determine It in Eqs. (9) and (10). The estimates of TAR and MTAR models 
show that the null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration can be rejected at the 5% 
level of significance. The estimated threshold parameters in the TAR model are -0.415 
for improving budgets and -0.299 for worsening budget deficits while these parameters 
in the MTAR model are -0.331 for improving budgets and -0.548 for worsening budgets. 
The F-statistics for testing nonlinear cointegration (Ф) are compared with the critical 
values to determine the existence of cointegration. Evidence of threshold cointegration 
in terms of TAR and MTAR is not found since the F-statistic of the TAR model for testing 
the null hypothesis that ρ1=ρ2=0 is 5.846 is smaller than the critical value of 7.464 at the 
5% level of significance while the Ф-statistic for the MTAR model is 6.195 is also smaller 
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than the critical value of 8.450 at the 1% level of significance.3 Also, evidence of 
asymmetry is found by testing the null hypothesis that ρ1=ρ2 because this hypothesis is 
rejected by the standard F-equal statistic at the 5% level of significance for both TAR 
and MTAR models.4 The tests for asymmetric adjustment of Eq. (4) are reported in 
Table 9. 
Table 9 
Estimates of the Budgetary Disequilibrium: TAR and MTAR Models. 
Parameters Models 
 TAR MTAR 
ρ1 0.024 -0.585 
ρ2 -0.061 -0.326 
Threshold Value 0.242 0.066 
Ф 1.459 [5.770] 6.574 [8.158] 
t-Max 0.068 [-1.565] -2.825 [-1.825] 
F-equal 2.461 [7.732] 1.607 [8.352] 
κ 4 3 
Note: The number in bracket is the simulated 5% critical value., κ is the number of lag 
determined by AIC. 
 
The optimal lag for the TAR model is 4 while the optimal lag for the MTAR model is 3 
determined by AIC. The convergence condition is met for the MTAR model, but not for 
the TAR model. In a similar manner, the null hypotheses of no threshold cointegration 
and of no asymmetric adjustments are accepted for both models. 
The absence of nonlinear and asymmetric long-run relationship does not allow for the 
analysis of short-run dynamics. Therefore, the analysis of asymmetric VECM expressed 
in equations (11) and (12) is not necessary.  
The standard causality tests are performed on first differences of the two series. The 
results are reported in Table 10.  
 
Table 10 
Results of Granger Causality tests. 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
ΔGt does not cause ΔRt. 2.589** 0.021 
ΔRt does not cause ΔGt. 1.210 0.303 
Note: *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The optimal lag of 2 
is determined by AIC. 
 
                                                           
3
 According to Hansen and Seo (2002), the F-test for TAR and MTAR models has a non-standard 
distribution due to the presence of nuisance parameters that are only identified by the 
alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the test critical values must be computed. 
4 The results also indicate that convergence condition is met, i. e., ρ1 < 0. ρ2 < 0 and (1+ρ1)(1+ρ2) 
< 1. According to Pettrucelli and Woolford (1984), this convergence condition is the condition 
for the stationarity of the residual series. Even though the t-Max statistic leads to an rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration, the Ф statistic leads to an acceptance of the 
null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration. The t-Max statistic has lower power than the 
Ф-statistic. 
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The results in Table 10 reveal that the null hypotheses that ΔGt does not cause ΔRt can 
be rejected at the 5% level of significance while the null hypothesis that ΔRt does not 
cause ΔGt is rejected. Therefore, the results confirm the existence of unidirectional 
causality between revenue and spending. Therefore, it can be concluded that there 
exists unidirectional causality running from government spending to government 
revenue. This finding seems to support the spend-and-tax hypothesis of Roberts (1978) 
and Peacock and Wiseman (199). The results do not support the fiscal synchronization 
hypothesis proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Musgrave (1966), which 
postulates that the voters’ choice determines the concurrent adjustment in both tax 
revenue and spending.  This finding is not in line with the finding by Tiwari and 
Mutascu (2016) in the case of Romania and Athanasenas et al. (2014) in the case of 
Greece. By contrast, the tax-and-spend hypothesis proposed by friedman (1978) is not 
supported because only government spending causes government revenue. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examines the nexus between government revenue and spending in the case 
of Thailand during 1993 and 2016. To detect the possibility of asymmetric adjustment 
toward long-run equilibrium, the TAR and MTAR models are used. The results show 
that both models  do not capture nonlinear cointegration between government revenue 
and spending because the null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration cannot be 
rejected. Therefore, both TAR and MTAR models are not suitable and do not lend 
support for the presence of asymmetric adjustment process toward the long-run 
equilibrium. By finding the evidence in favor of linear cointegration between revenue 
and spending, i.e., government spending positively causes revenue in the long run. The 
time series dynamics of the relationship between the two variables are explored in an 
ECM framework. It is found that government revenue is a dependent variable, the stable 
long-run relationship is established. The results from the standard causality test show 
that government spending causes revenue, but not the other way around. The results 
seem to support the spend-and-tax hypothesis. 
By knowing the relationship between government revenue and spending, policymakers 
should be able to identify the cause of fiscal imbalances. The finding in this paper gives 
some policy implications. Even though budget deficits can be expansionary to the 
economy, there is an upper limit for policymakers to allow too large budget deficits 
because when revenue falls short of spending, public debts can be prevalent.  
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